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ON MARKETS FOR RISK
MARK SAGOFF*
What are we afraid of? If you ride a bus in Washington, D.C., you
might find out. Huge red letters scream to you:
STAND BACK OF WHITE LINE
DO NOT TALK TO DRIVER WHILE BUS IS IN
MOTION
EMERGENCY EXIT
KEEP AWAY FROM DOORS
A Martian, were he or she or it to ride a public bus, might guess that we
fear traffic accidents more than anything else.
Yet this is plainly false. We may go to great lengths to make buses
safe, but when we get into our own cars, we do not even bother with the
seat belts. We do very little about drunk driving although, according to
government estimates, alcohol is a factor in at least one-half of the
50,000 traffic deaths that occur in the United States each year.' While
virtually ignoring this major source of death and injury, we willingly
spend about $5 million per life saved in protecting ourselves from the
hazards of radiation.2
The anomalies that arise in public policy toward risk are repeated
over and over again in private decisions. People who engage in dan-
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ronmental and Estuarine Studies (Horn Point Laboratories), University of Maryland. A.B.
1963, Harvard College; Ph.D. 1970, University of Rochester. Work on this article was sup-
ported by the National Science Foundation and National Endowment for the Humanities,
Grant No. OSS 8018096. Views expressed are the author's not necessarily those of the NEH
or NSF. An earlier version of this paper was presented at a conference sponsored by Naza-
reth College, Rochester, and is to appear in its proceedings, SCIENCE AND MORALITY (D.
Teichler-Zallen & C. Clements eds. 1982). Permission of the publisher gratefully acknowl-
edged. The author also acknowledges helpful suggestions from his colleagues, especially
Douglas MacLean.
1. INFORMATION PLEASE ALMANAC 827 (1980). For a table of fatality estimates from
various accidental and environmental causes, see Slovic, Fischhoff, & Lichtenstein, Rating
the Risks, ENV'T, Apr. 1979, at 14, 19. For an expanded study of actual vs. perceived risk,
see Fischhoff, How Safe is Safe Enough? A4 Psychometric Study fAttitudes Towards Techno-
logical Risks and Benefits, 9 POL'Y SCI. 127 (1978).
2. The valuation of life in the context of nuclear reactor safety is a concern of the
Bulletin of.4tomic Scientists. See, e.g., Holdren, The Nuclear Controversy and the Limitations
of Decisionmaking by Experts, 32 BULL. ATOM. SCIENTISTS 20 (Mar. 1976); Primack, Nuclear
Reactor Safety: An Introduction to the Issues, 31 BULL. ATOM. SCIENTISTS 15 (Sept. 1975);
see also C. Sinclair, P. Marstrand, & P. Newick, Innovation and Human Risk (Center for
the Study of Indus. Innovation, London, 1972).
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
gerous sports - parachuting and mountain climbing are examples -
may refuse to touch coffee for fear it contains a carcinogen. Likewise, a
friend of mine who chain smokes makes sure there are no "chemicals"
in her food. I suppose this attitude is reflected in public policy, for,
while the law permits cigarettes to be advertised in newspapers and
magazines, it prohibits any additive in food that can be linked with
cancer.
3
The greatest anomaly in our attitude toward risk may be historical.
People are exposed to far fewer hazards today than they were fifty or a
hundred years ago. Yet we seem to worry about the dangers in our
environment now more than ever. Diseases that were scourges at the
turn of the century - pneumonia, influenza, tuberculosis - are com-
paratively innocuous today. I need not mention what food and
medicine were like before the regulation of food, drugs, and cosmetics
early this century.4 Yet we have become more, not less, suspicious. As
one observer says:
One day we hear about the danger of mercury, and run to throw
out cans of tuna fish from our shelves; the next day the food to
shun may be butter, which our grandparents considered the acme
of wholesomeness; then we have to scrub the lead paint off our
walls. Today, the danger lurks in the phosphates in our favorite
detergent; tomorrow the finger points to insecticides, which were
hailed a few years ago as saviors of millions from hunger and dis-
ease. The threats of death, insanity, and - somehow even more
fearsome - cancer lurk in all we eat or touch.'
I imagine that more of us are in a "doomsday" mood, expecting, as
it were, the end of the world or something like it, now than a century
ago, when millenial movements were strong.6 "How extraordinary,"
Aaron Wildavsky, the economist, writes. "The richest, longest-lived,
best-protected, most resourceful civilization, with the highest degree of
insight into its own technology, is on its way to becoming the most
frightened."7
3. The Delaney Clause of the Food Additives Amendment Act, 21 U.S.C.
§ 348(c)(3)(A) (1976) requires that "no [food] additive shall be deemed to be safe if it is
found . . . after tests . . . to induce cancer in man or animal." This principle has been
extended to animal feeds, 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(3)(A) (1976), and food coloring, 21 U.S.C.
§ 376(b)(5)(B) (1976).
4. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codi-
fied at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392 (1976)).
5. Rabinowitch, Living Dangerously in the Age ofScience, 31 BULL. ATOM. SCIENTISTS
5 (Jan. 1972).
6. See J. MADDOX, THE DOOMSDAY SYNDROME (1972).
7. Wildavsky, No Risk ir the Highest Risk of,4/, 67 AM. SCIENTIST 32 (Jan./Feb. 1979).
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I
These anomalies in the way we deal with risk are a function, per-
haps, of our tendency to accept - even seek - all kinds of risks we
would never dream of imposing on anyone else. We would fight, per-
haps, before we would allow anyone to impose such risks on us. It is
one thing to jump voluntarily; it is another to be pushed even if the
risks and rewards are the same. Californians who are finicky about
what Nestles has put in their eggnog build their patios on the San An-
dreas fault. They want the eggnog, like the earthquake, to be "natu-
ral." I am not sure what this means, but it is not a new sentiment
(taboos about pollution are as old as history) and it is important.
The risks we are willing to take as members of the public seem to
belong to a different order than the risks we voluntarily accept as pri-
vate individuals. We insist on stringent fire protection in hotels and
hospitals while we do little about protecting our own homes. We re-
quire airplanes to be completely safe while we risk our lives constantly
by failing to maintain our automobiles. We smoke but we are upset to
discover minute traces of some possible carcinogen in our drinking
water. Many factors enter in. Chauncy Starr, a dozen years ago, iden-
tified what is probably the most important one. The public, he wrote, is
willing to accept "voluntary" risks that are a thousand times greater
than "involuntary" ones.8
Is the public, then, irrational? The following argument suggests
that we are.
1. Assume we want to achieve the most safety at the least cost.
2. The efficient way to achieve our goal is to minimize the margi-
nal cost of each unit of added safety. (In other words: spend
money in ways that will produce the most overall safety.)
3. Assume that people are irrational if they reject an efficient
means to reach their goal and prefer a much less efficient or
even totally ineffective one instead.
4. Consider two risks, one "voluntary" and the other "involun-
tary." Suppose that they pose the same danger, e.g., one is
benzene at home while the other is benzene in the workplace.
Suppose, moreover, that it is a thousand times more expensive
to lower exposure to benzene in the workplace (where the
chemical is a necessary element in industrial processes) than in
the home (where substitutes can easily be found).
From premises 2 and 4, we may conclude:
8. Starr, Social Benoft versus Technological Rule, 165 ScI. 1232, 1237 (1969).
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5. It is very much more efficient (by a ratio of 1,000 to 1) to lessen
the risk at home than to lessen the risk in the workplace.
"The indications are that the public is willing to accept 'voluntary' risks
roughly 1,000 times greater than 'involuntary' risks." 9 The public,
then, would permit the "voluntary" risk at home while preventing the
"involuntary" risk in the workplace. From steps 3 and 5, we then
conclude:
6. The public is irrational.
If we assume we want to achieve the most safety at a certain cost,
then we do seem to be irrational - for we swallow many a camel of
risk (as in smoking) while straining at gnats (radioactive medical
wastes). This irrationality, moreover, if that is what it is, may be found
in our legislation. If the Toxic Substances Control Act,'" the Clean Air
Act," and the Clean Water Act of 197712 were intended principally to
achieve safety within the bounds of efficiency - to ensure the public
health to the extent that the "benefits" outweigh the "costs" - then,
indeed, much that is in these laws appears to make no sense.13
If overall efficiency is our goal, economists may know better than
politicians how to achieve it. We might better be governed, then, by
the Council of Economic Advisors than by elected representatives.
Some experts have reached this conclusion. These analysts propose,
therefore, that they should formulate public policy on the basis of the
best available scientific studies and the finest techniques of risk-benefit
analysis.' 4 Experts in the field of policy analysis talk in terms of
9. Id
10. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1976).
11. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970) (codi-
fied at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (Supp. III 1979)).
12. Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 (1977) (codified at 33
U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976 & Supp. III 1979)).
13. For example, §§ 160-169 of the Clean Air Act as Amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7470-7479
(1977), classifies large areas of the West as Class I areas in which "significant deterioration"
of air quality is not permitted. This effectively forecloses the development of important
energy resources without regard to the benefits or costs. Likewise, much of our environmen-
tal legislation is technology based - requiring the use of the "best reasonably available
control technology" rather than the technology that will be cost-effective or cost-beneficial.
See, e.g., the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (1976), which requires
the discharge of effluents to be reduced over several years and thus forces technological
development to accomplish that goal. By 1977 all industries had to install the "best practica-
ble control technology currently available," id. § 1311 (b)(l)(A), and by 1983 they must use
the "best available technology economically achievable," id. § 1311 (b)(2)(A). The Court of
Appeals of the District of Columbia praised this "technology-forcing" strategy as evidence
of EPA's "commitment to the development of sound guidelines." Natural Resources De-
fense Council v. Train, 510 F.2d 692, 712 n.!05 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
14. For discussion of the relevance of risk-benefit analysis to public policy concerning
environmental and workplace hazards, see W. LOWRANCE, OF ACCEPTABLE RISK 94-101
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"tradeoffs."' 5 How much is a life worth - or how much are we willing
to pay to reduce risk by a certain amount?' 6 How much GNP, con-
sumer "satisfaction," or "welfare" are we willing to forego for how
much safety? - These are the kinds of questions policy analysts ask.'"
To answer these questions, economists study our behavior under
risk to determine how much we are willing to pay for safety, e.g., in
equipping our cars with seat belts or our homes with smoke detectors. Is
(They find that we spend a lot to avoid some risks while we blithely
ignore others - which makes us "irrational" or at least uninformed or
mistaken if, indeed, overall safety is our principal concern.)' 9 Econo-
mists use this information to justify estimates of how much safety is
worth to us, that is, in dollar terms, how safe is safe enough. They
recommend, then, that public policy be made efficient in the sense that
it provide safety only up to that dollar limit. They would make our
public attitude toward safety reflect the private attitudes we reveal or
would reveal in markets. Since markets often do not exist to price envi-
ronmental hazards, public policy may make up that lack. Law would
be justified as a substitute for - or as a prophylactic upon - the func-
tioning of consumer markets.2 °
Once we assume, as many economists do, that markets, real or hy-
pothetical, provide the appropriate framework for the social evaluation
of risk, it becomes plausible to suppose that we should always buy the
(1976); Leape, Quantitative Risk Assessment in Regulation of Environmental Carcinogens, 4
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 86 (1980); Lovins, Cost-Risk-Benefit Assessments in Energy Policy, 45
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 911 (1977); Ricci & Molton, Risk and Beneft in Environmental Law,
214 Sci. 1096 (1981); Rowe, Government Regulation of Societal Risks, 45 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 944 (1977).
15. See, e.g., Schwing, Trade-offs, in SOCIETAL RISK ASSESSMENT: How SAFE IS SAFE
ENOUGH? 129 (R. Schwing & W. Albers, Jr. eds. 1980) [hereinafter cited as SOCIETAL RISK
ASSESSMENT].
16. The classic paper is Schelling, The Life You Save May Be Your Own, in PROBLEMS
IN PUBLIC EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS 127 (S. Chase ed. 1968); see also, Zeckhauser, Proce-
duresfor Valuing Lives, PUB. POL'Y, Fall 1975, at 442. For comment, see Hapgood, Risk-
Benefit Anasis." Putting a Price on Lie, 243 ATL. 33 (Jan. 1979).
17. See, e.g., Thaler & Rosen, The Value of Saving a Lfe. Evidencefrom the Labor Mar-
ket, in HOUSEHOLD PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION (N. Terleckyj ed. 1976); Linnerooth,
Methodsfor Evaluating Mortality Risk, 8 FUTURES 293 (1976).
18. See, e.g., Conley, The Value of Human Life in the Demandfor Safety, 66 AM. EcON.
REv. 45 (1976).
19. See Slovic, Fischhoff, & Lichtenstein, Facts and Fears- Understanding Perceived
Risk, in SOCIETAL RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 15, at 181 and authorities cited therein.
20. Frank Michelman has written: "In the economic vision, it is only the prospect of
overcoming the market's failure to capture gains from trade that can justify, from the indi-
vidual's standpoint, the risks of exploitation inherent in majoritarian political institutions."
Michelman, Politics and Economics or What's Really Wrong with Rationality Review?, 13
CREIGHTON L. REV. 487, 498 (1979).
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most safety we can at the least cost - up to the point at which we are
no longer willing to pay to increase safety. Instead of making airlines
very safe, for example, we might use some of that money on anti-smok-
ing campaigns or on driver education. We might make risk manage-
ment, then, cost-effective.2 We would seek " 'to equate the marginal
costs of saving lives across programs for a certain number of lives
saved.' "22
Industries, in this spirit, have petitioned the courts to overturn "ir-
rational" regulations on cost-benefit grounds.2 3 (Litigation over the
OSHA benzene2 4 and cotton dust 25 standards are excellent examples.)
President Reagan, by Executive order, has instructed all departments
and agencies that "[riegulatory action shall not be undertaken unless
the potential benefits to society outweigh . . . the costs to society."26
Some of the President's advisors have suggested that the courts should
invalidate all laws that are not cost-beneficial, i.e., that are inconsistent
with overall economic efficiency. 27 There are as many ways to force
people to be "rational" as there are ways to force them to be "free."
I shall argue here, however, that efficiency is not the principal goal
we pursue either as individuals or as a society in managing hazards and
21. Michael S. Baram writes: "Cost-benefit analsis ... is used by the decisionmaker to
establish societal goals as well as the means for achieving these goals, whereas cost-effective-
ness analysis only compares alternative means for achieving 'given' goals." Baram, Cost-
Benefit Analysis." An Inadequate Basisfor Health, Safety, and Environmental Regulatory Deci-
sionmaking, 8 ECOLOGY L.Q. 473, 478 (1980) (footnote omitted). Baram comments that to
the extent economic factors are permissible considerations under enabling statutes, agencies
should engage in cost-effectiveness analysis, which aids in determining the least costly means
to achieve designated goals, rather than cost-benefit analysis, which improperly determines
regulatory ends as well as means. Id. at 474.
22. SOCIETAL RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 15, at 144-45 (quoting A. Kneese, staff
economist, Resources for the Future).
23. Major cases in which industry requested relief from regulation on cost-benefit
grounds include: American Iron & Steel Inst. v. OSHA, 577 F.2d 825 (3d Cir. 1978); Aqua
Slide 'N Dive v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm., 569 F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1978); Certified
Color Mfr's. Ass'n v. Matthews, 543 F.2d 284 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Industrial Union Dep't,
AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
24. Industrial Union Dep't., AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607
(1980).
25. American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 101 S. Ct. 2478 (1981).
26. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13, 193 (1981). The order specifies that the
cost-benefit requirement shall apply "to the extent permitted by law."
27. Members of President Reagan's task force on regulation have taken this position.
"On regulatory reform, Mr. Weidenbaum of Washington University, chairman of that task
force, said he favored an executive order requiring agencies to conduct cost-benefit analyses
before adopting regulations. . .. James Miller of the American Enterprise Institute, an-
other task force member, said he thought all agencies should be required to prove that the
benefits of a proposed regulation exceed its cost, and that it has chosen that [sic] least costly
alternative. He also said that regulatory analyses. . . should be mandatory and subject to
judicial review." Nat'l L.J., Nov. 17, 1980, at 9.
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risks. Once we see that we have something beside efficiency in mind -
once we see that our goal is not even safety - I believe that most of our
private behavior and public law concerning risk can be appreciated and
understood for what it is. The principal value informing public law for
the workplace and the environment - as well as private behavior -
may be autonomy, not efficiency.2 1 Public policy, then, may not repre-
sent an attempt to increase welfare, utility, or "satisfaction." It may
represent our attempt, rather, to control the conditions under which we
pursue happiness - the conditions under which we lead our lives.
II
A distinction betweenfreedom and autonomy will help me make
this point. You arefree, according to a traditional conception of free-
dom, insofar as you can do or get what you want. This popular, if
rough or crude, conception of freedom needs qualification,29 of course,
but it will do for our purposes. You may see a connection between
social efficiency and this conception of freedom. An efficient society -
a society that maximizes the satisfaction of preferences - helps indi-
viduals to get what they want. An efficient society need not be a happy
one; no one has shown that the satisfaction of wants leads to happiness
more than to disappointment.30 Yet efficiency may be said to increase
a kind of freedom. This is not the political freedom we have to make
28. I omit the possibility that economists might survey individuals to find out how much
they are willing to pay for autonomy and thus assign this commodity a price in a cost-benefit
analysis. Burton Weisbrod has suggested a model by which considerations of justice or eq-
uity might be brought into efficiency estimates or what he calls "grand-efficiency." Weis-
brod, Income Redistribution Effects and Benefit-Cost Analysis, in PROBLEMS IN PUBLIC
EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS 177 (1968).
29. I agree with Gary Watson, who writes:
According to one familiar conception of freedom, a person is free to the extent that he is
able to do or get what he wants. To circumscribe a person's freedom is to contract the
range of things he is able to do. I think that, suitably qualified, this account is correct
Watson, Free Agency, 72 J. PHIL. 205, 205 (Apr. 24, 1975). Watson qualifies his account by
arguing that a person is free only to the extent that he acts upon motives that are also values
or express his valuational system. Watson characterizes a person's valuational system as
"that set of considerations which, when combined with ... factual beliefs. . . yields judg-
ments of the form: the thing for me to do, in these circumstances, is a." Id. at 215. Watson's
thesis is entirely consistent with the view argued by Charles Taylor that responsibility for
oneself requires one to be a critic and evaluator of one's own motives. Taylor, fResponsbility
for Self, in THE IDENTITIES OF PERSONS 281 (A. Rorty ed. 1976).
30. For a superb study of consumer disappointment and its connection with political
action, see A.O. HIRSCHMAN, SHIFTING INVOLVEMENTS: PRIVATE INTEREST AND PUBLIC
ACTION (1982). For an excellent argument that markets do not satisfy our wants but rather
make us dissatisfied with them, see Lane, Markets and the Satisfaction of Human Wants, 12
J. ECON. ISSUES 799 (1978).
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laws for ourselves - laws that may express our public values as distinct
from our private interests. 31 It is a freedom markets provide - "free-
dom in the traffic" 32 - a freedom to satisfy wants.
An efficient society promotes the ability of the individuals in it to
satisfy their wants and desires; it promotes freedom in the sense that
refers to an individual's welfare. This sense of freedom - "negative"
freedom or freedom from interference in one's pursuit of happiness33
- has no necessary connection with autonomy. Freedom, in this sense,
has to do with getting what you want or doing as you like; autonomy,
on the other hand, consists in your ability to get or to do these things on
your own, without being beholden to any other person, without ac-
cepting favors, and without having the important background decisions
made by somebody else.
If you have to depend for your welfare on the wisdom, expertise,
or goodwill of others, if they determine what you want or how you are
to get it, then you lack autonomy, even if your benefactors are wiser
than you and cut you the best deal they can. If you rely instead upon
your own actions and decisions, then you may have autonomy even if
you fail to achieve your ends. Duncan Kennedy puts the idea this way.
He writes that a person is free to the extent that he satisfies his prefer-
ences. Freedom in that sense is coincident with welfare. "Autonomy,
by contrast, does not refer to the degree of satisfaction, but to the char-
acter of the circumstances on which satisfaction is dependent."34
Statements concerning an "environmental ethic," properly under-
stood, may have more to do with the autonomy of individuals than
with the efficiency of society. "A thing is right," Aldo Leopold wrote,
"when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the
biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise. ' 35 The appeal
of this statement, I believe, depends on the belief that we all compete as
equals under rules that nature sets: gravity and the carbon dioxide cy-
cle apply to everyone equally; therefore, these violate no one's auton-
omy. An artificial environment introduces human control, and with it
31. For a presentation of this distinction in the context of cost-benefit analysis, see
Maass, Benefit-Cost Analysis." Its Relevance to Public Investment Decisions, 80 Q.J. ECON.
208, 213-19 (1966). For a more general discussion, see B. BARRY, POLITICAL ARGUMENT
71-72, 81-83, 94-95, 132-35, 295-98 (1965). For a discussion of the relevance of this distinc-
tion to environmental regulation, see Sagoff, At the Shrine of Our Lady of Fatima or Why
Political Questions Are Not Al Economic, 23 ARiz. L. REV. 1283 (1981).
32. S. Holmes, Transformations of Legitimacy 71 (May 1976) (Yale Univ. Doctoral
Thesis).
33. I. BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY (1969).
34. Kennedy, LegalFormality, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 351, 371 (1973) (emphasis in original).
35. A. LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC AND SKETCHES HERE AND THERE 224-25
(1975).
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the distinction between those who manipulate and those who are
manipulated. We may have more welfare in a more artificial or more
controlled environment than in a natural environment, but we are not
likely to have more autonomy. The conditions of our well-being, even
if they are enhanced in a highly technological rather than in a "sim-
pler" society, tend to be less in our own hands.
E.F. Schumacher, in his book Small Is Beautiful,3 6 hit upon a
formula which appeals to a vast constituency. We need not argue
whether small is efficient, whether, for example, solar and wind power
may generate more electricity more safely and cheaply than nuclear
reactors. That question, I believe, is somewhat beside the point. Small
is not beautiful because it is efficient; it is beautiful because it encour-
ages autonomy. It gives people control of the means by which they
satisfy their desires and this, I believe, may be more important to them
than whether the desires are satisfied. (Does this thought lie behind the
Marxist idea of giving workers control of the means of production -
which could include worker control of nuclear power plants?) The nic-
est thing about solar panels and windmills, from the environmentalist
perspective, is that you or I can decide whether to install them. The
bad thing about nuclear power is that the decision is somehow up to
"them." 37
Economists who believe that much of our behavior under risk is
irrational might take another view of it were they to consider that it
may be motivated, not by fear, but by resentment.38 The problem,
then, would be to explain, not why we fear some dangers more than
others, but why we resent some dangers more than others. One answer
is plain. We resent risks imposed upon us, as members of the public,
by those who seek, in doing so, to achieve economic ends. We resent
these risks because those who subject us to them treat us not as ends in
ourselves but as means to the production of some economic goal such
as efficiency or wealth. This is not a value system to which many of us
would subscribe, for society or for ourselves; yet it seems to be imposed
upon us by those who take an economic view of regulatory policy. Ac-
cordingly, people who resent being subjected to technological risks,
e.g., dangers associated with nuclear technology, become even more
36. E. SCHUMACHER, SMALL IS BEAUTIFUL: ECONOMICS AS IF PEOPLE MATTERED
(1973).
37. For an expanded argument on this theme, see Sagoff, supra note 31, at 1296-98.
38. For discussion of the concept of resentment and its connection with freedom, desert,
and valuation generally, see P. STRAWSON, Freedom and Resentment, in FREEDOM AND RE-
SENTMENT AND OTHER ESSAYS 1 (1974); see also Wolf, The Importance ofFree Will, 90
MIND 386 (1981).
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angry when they are told that the risks to the public are small in rela-
tion to the benefits. They resent these risks even though they acknowl-
edge that they face greater dangers quite casually, for example, when
they drive their cars.
I want to suggest that people in the environmental, anti-nuclear,
and consumer movements are less concerned about freedom than about
autonomy. If environmental legislation is seen as an attempt to pre-
serve individual autonomy, public policy toward risk is not irrational.
The decision to enforce limits on benzene exposure in the workplace,
but not the home, for example, is simply a decision to protect people
from risks imposed by others while leaving them free to accept or reject
the risks they personally can control.
Cost-benefit analysis, then, cannot be justified as a means of
achieving the public's primary goal, for that goal may not be efficiency;
it may be autonomy. People want to determine the background level of
risk; they do not want the working conditions of their lives to be deter-
mined by others. It does not matter how cost-beneficial risks are; it is a
question, rather, of who controls them. To environmentalists of this
persuasion there is only one sort of acceptable risk. It is not necessarily
a risk the benefits of which exceed the costs. It is a risk that people
understand and to which they or their political representatives do, in
fact, consent.
III
Economists suggest that they, like environmentalists, are con-
cerned with consent. A market approach, they argue, identifies the
risks to which people would consent if, as a practical matter, they could
reveal or act upon their individual preferences.39 They say that mar-
kets, if free and fair, are unanimous consent arrangements.4 ° This is a
tautology, indeed, if any transaction that affects individuals who do not
consent to it is counted as a market failure. They also say that any
transaction to which two rational self-interested parties consent benefits
both.4 This too, is tautological, given plausible assumptions about the
nature of "rational self-interest." I do not want to quarrel here with
39. Richard Posner argues that "consent is the operational basis of the concept of Pareto
superiority . . . . We are then led . . . to an ethical defense of market transactions that is
unrelated to their effect in promoting efficiency ....... Posner, The Ethical and Political
Basis of the Efficiency Norm in Common Law Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 487, 490
(1980).
40. "In the first place, relationships in the market are a form of unanimous-consent ar-
rangement." C. SCHULTZE, THE PUBLIC USE OF PRIVATE INTEREST 16 (1977).
41. "A most important point that I wish to make about the phenomenon of exchange is
that not just one but both parties to an exchange are better off after the exchange is executed
[VOL. 41
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these two propositions. I only want to point out that they are different.
One justifies markets in terms of consent; the other, in terms of aggre-
gate efficiency or satisfied consumer demand.
Together, they give us an important principle - that unanimous
consent arrangements, which characterize free and fair markets, lead to
efficient or optimal outcomes. This is the conceptual basis of argu-
ments Milton Friedman and others have offered in favor of capital-
ism. 2 Because these arguments rest, as I have suggested, on a system
of tautological definitions, I cannot fault their logical consistency, al-
though I question whether they apply or ever could apply to anything
that exists or is likely to exist in America or elsewhere. The problem
that concerns me, however, is how to make centralized or public deci-
sions - e.g., decisions about the distribution of risk associated with
energy development and waste disposal - that people do not consent
to through market transactions. What then is the role of market or
cost-benefit analysis? When markets fail or when relevant markets ex-
ist only in the imaginations, surveys, and writings of economists, what
is the relationship between efficiency and consent?
I want to suggest that there is none. Economists argue, as I have
said, that consent leads to efficiency. On the basis of this argument
economists unfortunately tend to assume the converse, namely, that ef-
ficiency can stand as a suitable substitute for consent.43 Where markets
do not exist, or where market failure is endemic, economists tend to
assume that what a "perfect" market would do is what people would
consent to. But this assumes what may be false - that a market should
exist in the problematic area and that people would consent to making
transactions within such a market.
Consider the way many economists establish a "value" for life. In
a typical research experiment, an economist offers subjects a hypotheti-
cal choice, say, one million dollars, in exchange for running a million-
to-one risk of instant death. Almost everyone accepts that hypothetical
bargain. The odds of death may then be increased, the payment de-
than they were before." W. BAXTER, PEOPLE OR PENGUINS: THE CASE FOR OPTIMAL POL-
LUTION 19 (1974).
42. M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM ch. 1 (1962).
43. As long as "redistributive considerations are not salient," Richard Posner writes,
"consent to efficient solutions can be presumed; ... politically influential groups can do no
better, in general, than to support efficient policies." Posner, supra note 39, at 488.
For a presentation of the assumptions behind this move from what efficient markets
would do to what governments ought to enforce, see Kneese, Environmental Policy, in THE
UNITED STATES IN THE 1980's 253 (P. Duignan & A. Bavushka eds. 1980). For a typical
discussion of the way Pareto notions of improvement or efficiency connect consent with the
outcome of cost-benefit analysis, see E. GRAMLICH, BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS OF GOVERN-
MENT PROGRAMS ch. 4 (1981).
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creased, or both, until some indifference point is reached. Economists
frequently advocate the use of this "switch" point in establishing safety
standards for nuclear reactors and for other dangerous technologies.'
The problem with this approach may become apparent if we
change the offer to involve a risk, not of death, but of being tortured,
sodomized, having one's hand cut off, becoming a slave, or undergoing
a needless lobotomy. Here the economist may ask, for example, if you
would accept $50,000 in exchange for a 1/1000 probability you will be
enslaved the rest of your life. Suppose you take the hypothetical bar-
gain. Suppose, moreover, a trade-off point is established at which peo-
ple generally would accept a cash payment in exchange for a small risk
of being made prostitutes or slaves. What have we learned about regu-
latory policy? How can this information possibly tell us anything we
could use or want to know?
That experiments of this kind are perverse becomes obvious when
we reflect that we would outlaw all such bargains were they to be made,
not hypothetically, but in fact. If you accept a 1,000-to-1 gamble on
being killed for a sum of money and then have bad luck (e.g., because
the wheel stops at your number), whoever made the offer, nevertheless,
would be arrested were he to kill you. It is still murder even if it is
efficient. One simply cannot legally set up a market of this kind. Like-
wise, you cannot raffle yourself into slavery. Again, outside of the
"dunking" booths at fund-raisers, where you buy "shots" at soaking
your boss, our society does not allow markets in torture. If actual mar-
kets are forbidden in death, slavery, torture, etc., what could we possi-
bly learn from hypothetical markets? Why would we want to
determine when death, torture, slavery, or what-have-you is efficient?
Why should a civilized society wish to know that?45
IV
An answer might be that we need to know how much to spend "at
44. See, e.g., Mishan, Evaluation of Life and Limb. A Theoretical Approach, 79 J. POL.
ECON. 687 (1971); Zeckhauser, Proceduresfor Valuing Lives, 23 PUB. POL'Y 419 (1975).
45. Graham Greene's DOCTOR FISCHER OF GENEVA OR THE BOMB PARTY (1980) tells
of a party in which guests are invited to pull open Christmas crackers which either contain a
sizable check or a lethal bomb. The party is not the idea of an economist but rather of a
misanthropist. He gives it so that his guests, driven by greed, will humiliate themselves and
thus reinforce and vindicate his contempt for the human race. For a discussion of degrading
or perverse preferences (though not one that concerns economic approaches to risk), see
Barry, Lady Chatterley's Lover and Dr. Fischer's Bomb Party. Liberalism, Pareto Optimality
and the Problem of Objectionable Preferences, in FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY
(J. Elster ed.) (forthcoming); see also Goodin, Laundering Preferences, in FOUNDATIONS OF
SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY (J. Elster ed.) (forthcoming).
[VOL. 41
ON MARKETS FOR RISK
the margin" for lifesaving equipment and for safety in the environment
and in the workplace. Let us suppose this is so. Why would individual
willingness to pay in hypothetical risk markets give us a basis on which
to determine this amount? Three reasons come to mind. First, individ-
ual willingness-to-pay, one may argue, indicates an efficient trade-off
point between safety and cost.46 Second, it may be said that people, on
the average, would consent to the trade-off. Third, one may argue that
the number we get (say, somewhere about $300,000 per life saved)47
seems like a good one and there is no better way to derive it. All of
these reasons, however, are plainly inadequate.
As for the first, we must ask why effciency should determine the
level of risk to be imposed upon the public. Surely we do not torture
criminals for confessions when it is efficient to do so. (We do not ex-
periment with surrogate markets to determine what chance of torture
people would accept for money; nor would we use such a figure to jus-
tify torture.) Likewise, we do not shanghai luckless citizens as slaves
on the grounds that the social savings is more than people would pay to
avoid such a risk. We do not say that the luckless citizen consents to
being enslaved even if some slavery is efficient, i.e., even if overall ben-
efits exceed costs. If efficiency should not be a criterion for the distribu-
tion of torture or slavery, why, then, should it be a criterion for the
distribution of death? I simply see no answer to that question.
The second reason is no better. The fact that some people give a
hypothetical answer to a hypothetical question is not a ground to be-
lieve that other people - or even these people themselves - consent,
therefore, to an actual risk imposed upon them. Real consent is given
in real markets; and people must consent to the market as well as to the
trades they make in it. As far as I know, no one at Three Mile Island or
at Love Canal or anywhere outside of economics departments has con-
sented to the idea or to the ideology of a market approach to public
safety and health.
Let us suppose, finally, that we need a "trade-off" number, al-
46. "Consistency with the criterion of potential Pareto improvement and, therefore, con-
sistency with the principle of evaluation in cost-benefit analyses, would require that the loss
of a person's life be valued by reference to. . . the minimum sum he is prepared to accept in
exchange for its surrender." E. MISHAN, COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 305 (1976). This state-
ment occurs in a discussion of ways to assess willingness to pay as a criterion for establishing
a social valuation of risk for loss of life and limb.
47. M. Bailey, in REDUCING RISKS TO LIFE: MEASUREMENT OF THE BENEFITS 52-66
(1980), surveys various benefit-cost assessments to arrive at a plausible low bound between
$170,000 and $300,000 and a plausible high bound between $584,000 and $715,000. A
$287,175 figure is discussed by Hapgood, supra note 16, at 36.
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though this is itself a questionable assumption. 48 Is individual willing-
ness to pay - individual self-interest - the best or indeed the only
way to establish it? Plainly, not. The use of the surrogate market ap-
proach has the merit of setting up juries of citizens but the question it
asks them is the wrong one. They should be asked, not to report their
self-interest, but after weighing arguments and listening to reasons, to
state their view of the public interest. That information might be use-
ful to the policymaker. How much does the individual think the com-
munity should be willing to pay for ambulances? How much for anti-
smoking programs? What do we think the responsibility of industry
should be with respect to the safe disposal of its chemical wastes? How
much should the corporations be willing to invest of their profits for
reducing airborne hazards? Or keeping groundwater uncontaminated?
The amount individuals and corporations are willing to pay to reduce
risks is one thing; the amount they should be willing to pay is another.
The former "interest" may reflect whatever has been accepted in the
past. The latter determination, however, must be made politically
through informed normative discussion and debate.
V
The familiar verse:
Oh mother did you bring me silver,
Mother did you bring me gold,
Or did you come to see your son hanging
Hanging from the gallows pole?
reminds us of the time when sentencing was handled on the basis of
individual willingness to pay. We have not progressed very far, it
seems, if we rely on that standard in protecting public safety and
health. To ask how much people are willing to pay or to take for
avoiding or accepting a risk is to change their status from that of mem-
bers of the public, concerned with the nature of the society they live in,
to that of parties in a private contract, concerned only with how a trans-
action affects them. Individuals may resent the a priori switch of their
values and decisions from the public to the private realm; they may not
consent to the market in which they are compelled to make decisions
48. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. Regulations that are technology-based or
which otherwise set a standard "as safe as feasible" do not depend upon a determination of
"the value of life." Such a determination is not a condition of the policy but is a consequence
insofar as a dollar figure may be inferred from the cost of the technology.
768 [VOL. 41
ON MARKETS FOR RISK
that, as they think, ought to be left to the political process.4 9
To force people to think about public policy in market terms or in
risk-benefit terms is to compel them to accept a particular conception of
choice, indeed, a particular conception of consent. This conception of
consent may be popular among economists - at least those that are
wedded to the market paradigm. It is a conception, however, that may
be inappropriate to decisions made inforopublico; it may be inimical
to our political freedom and to the institutions of collective as opposed
to individual choice.
When juries of citizens make decisions in civil and criminal cases,
they act not on their rational self-interest, but on reasons of another
sort - the law, the evidence, and a conception of right and wrong.
Public officials should be guided by similar considerations. Their job is
not to maximize wealth but to respond to many values, one of which
may be efficiency, in making and applying public law. Political institu-
tions, in principle, give us freedom to choose not so much what to buy
as individuals, but what to be as a society - a freedom to associate for
common purposes and to decide the nature, market or nonmarket, of
our relationships with one another.
I have argued, in effect, that a vast difference exists between choice
based in self-interest and choice based in a conception of the common
interest. The relation between the two is not that of the part and the
whole; one is not a function of the other. They represent, rather, two
logically distinct strategies of choice." The individual who chooses on
the basis of self-interest need be given information only about the way
a particular policy affects him; he need have no concern about how
others are affected or about the nature of the policy itself. The individ-
ual who chooses on the basis of a conception of the common interest,
on the contrary, is concerned about the total meaning and effect of a
policy for the society as a whole. A market approach to public policy,
as one commentator has noted, "is so set up that 'one's own share' be-
comes the be-all and end-all."51 But the second approach, in which the
individual is asked to debate and then to vote for a conception of the
common will, "becomes a vote not just on shares but on policies, and
not just on a distribution as such, but on the principles involved."52
49. For discussion of this point, see Sagoff, We Have Met the Enemy and He Is Us or
Conflict and Contradiction in Environmental Law, 12 ENVTL. LAW 283 (1982).
50. For further argument, see Sagoff, Economic Theory and Environmental Law, 79
MICH. L. REV. 1393 (1981).
51. Rescher, Economics vs. Moral Philosophy, 10 THEORY & DECISION 169, 171 (1979).
52. Id.
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VI
The major statutes enabling administrative agencies to regulate
environmental and workplace hazards do not in general require a cost-
benefit or market approach to the management of risk.53 The Clean
Air Act,54 the Clean Water Act,55 and the Noise Control Act56 create
public entitlements to reasonably clean, safe, and quiet surroundings.
Likewise, the Occupational Safety and Health Act entitles workers to a
workplace in which they are treated as persons and not merely as fac-
tors in the production of wealth. 7 This is what we approve as a society
and this is as it should be on moral grounds. It is more important that
we respect each other's safety, privacy, and dignity as persons than that
we maximize utility.
I am aware that the legislation we have is sometimes vague. The
requirement that the workplace be free of risk insofar as is "feasible" is
a celebrated example of this vagueness.5" A cost-benefit approach to
risk, however, is no more definite than an approach that considers pub-
lic values: the concept of what is efficient is itself vague. For example,
economists easily can prepare cost-benefit analyses that support oppos-
ing sides in a policy dispute.5 ' Furthermore, any legislation that does
not itself set the standards for hazards or pollutants must stipulate the
goals to be achieved in qualitative terms. The agencies then must inter-
pret these goals quantitatively.60 The statute, no matter how well writ-
53. For discussion, see generally Baram, supra note 21.
54. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (Supp. Ill 1979).
55. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
56. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4901-4918 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
57. The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 defines an "occupational safety
and health standard" as a standard that is "reasonably necessary and appropriate to provide
safe and healthful employment." 29 U.S.C § 652(8) (1976). If toxic materials or chemicals
are involved, the-Secretary of Labor is required to "set the standard which most adequately
assures, to the extent feasible, on the basis of the best available evidence, that no employee
will suffer material impairment of health or functional capacity." Id. § 655(b)(5).
58. Id. For another example of vagueness, consider the Federal Environmental Pesti-
cide Control Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1976) which requires the EPA Administrator to ban
any pesticide which presents "any unreasonable risk to man or the environment, taking into
account the economic, social, and environmental costs and benefits." Id. § 136 (bb),
136d(b).
59. An excellent case study of this problem may be found in B. ACKERMAN, S. ROSE-
ACKERMAN, J. SAWYER, JR., & D. HENDERSON, THE UNCERTAIN SEARCH FOR ENVIRON-
MENTAL QUALITY (1974).
60. The fact that qualitative goals have to be implemented quantitatively raises the
problem of overdelegation of legislative power to the agencies. Justice Rehnquist, reading
the Occupational Safety and Health Act, found the relevant portion of § 6(b)(5) "completely
precatory, admonishing the Secretary to adopt the most protective standard if he can, but
excusing him from that duty if he can't. In the case of a hazardous substance for which a
'safe' level is either unknown or impractical, the language of § 6 (b)(5) gives the Secretary
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ten, is unlikely to rule out every standard but one. Thus political and
economic factors are bound to operate at the agency level. The point,
then, is to make the process at that level as open, fair, and intelligent as
possible.6 This is the antithesis of an administrative process that relies
on a cost-benefit analysis reviewed, behind closed doors, at the Office
of Management and Budget.62
Finally, the legislation we have, taken as a whole, is less vague
than it might seem to one who looks at the statutes individually. The
law as a whole clearly expresses a national policy toward environmen-
tal and workplace nuisances and hazards - to protect people from
hazards imposed on them without their consent. This legislation does
not establish an absolute right to protection - it does not mandate
safety at any cost; instead, it demands that economic and other consid-
erations be taken into account. This does not suggest, however, that
efficiency is or ought to be the goal of public policy or that all other
public goals or values count only as "externalities" deserving at most a
"shadow" or surrogate market price.63
Since our goal in regulating hazards may be to promote not just
efficiency but also autonomy, the statutes we have are hardly irrational,
but properly require us to go the extra economic mile to protect the
environment and the workplace. I am aware no one knows exactly
how long the extra mile should be; the law is unavoidably vague on this
point. We may judge the distance better, however, if we keep the fol-
lowing thought in mind. Let us not be overly concerned with welfare,
that is, with the question whether the self-interested consumer is satis-
absolutely no indication where on the continuum of relative safety to draw his line." Indus-
trial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 675 (1980) (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring). However, Justice Marshall, joined by three other Justices, found Congress to
have been sufficiently definite. "The word 'feasible' has a reasonably plain meaning, and its
interpretation can be informed by other contexts in which Congress has used it." Id. at 717
n. 30 (Marshall, J., dissenting.)
A statutory standard so vague as to permit basic policy decisions to be made at the
agency level might be considered an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority; Jus-
tice Rehnquist, then, might have invalidated a great deal of legislation on the rule he applied
in Industrial Union. Yet the courts, following Justice Marshall, stop short of this. See
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 529-42 (1935) (invalidating
President Roosevelt's authority under the National Industrial Recovery Act to approve
codes of "fair competition"). But see United States v. Rock Royal Coop. Inc., 307 U.S. 533,
577-78 (1939) (upholding delegation of power to the Secretary of Agriculture to set "reason-
able" milk prices).
61. For explanation, see generally K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY
INQUIRY (1969). But see Jaffe, The Illusion of the Ideal Administration, 86 HARV. L. REV.
1183 (1973).
62. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
63. See Kennedy, Cost-Benetft Analysis of Enttlement Problems." A Critique, 33 STAN. L.
REV. 387, 398-400 (1981).
19821
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
fled. Let us be concerned as well with autonomy, that is, with the ques-
tion whether people have some authority or say over the circumstances
in which they form their preferences and the conditions under which
they compete to satisfy them. The extra mile, then, would be longer
not necessarily where more lives can be saved but where the individual
is more imposed upon - where the risks he takes are less in his own
hands.
This nation first regulated conditions in the workplace primarily as
a response to the horrors that existed a century ago in sweat shops,
mines, and company towns.64 I have no idea whether these horrors
were efficient, that is, whether they emerged as a result of free, un-
coerced, and voluntary market transactions. Perhaps they did. I have
no idea whether the benefits of a fifteen-hour workday to society were
"worth" the costs. I have no idea whether child labor maximized over-
all societal wealth. I do know, however, that it does not matter. We
simply are not going to return to a fifteen-hour workday, to child labor,
or to an egregiously unsafe workplace whether to do so is efficient or
not. Why then call for risk-benefit analysis? Why suppose that the
problem with child labor is that the benefits do not equal the costs?
Laws that regulate the workplace and the environment - laws
ranging from the Fair Labor Standards Act65 to the Clean Air Act66 -
set forth an ideology concerning the standards a civilized society ought
to set for itself and respect. Laws of this kind do not correct, but re-
place, market mechanisms for collective choice. They assure some au-
tonomy for the ordinary citizen, by which I mean some success not in
satisfying the preferences he or she happens to have, but in determining
the background conditions under which he or she forms and pursues
those preferences. Through these laws we get a normative purchase
upon - we contol - the moral character of our relations with one
another.
VII
What are we afraid of? Do we fear that our health and safety are
severely threatened by the risks associated, for example, with nuclear
installations and industrial wastes? Perhaps. I have argued, however,
that we may have more reason to resent than to fear these and other
hazards. What we should fear, I believe, is that entitlements created by
64. For a summary, see J. FOLLMANN, JR., THE ECONOMICS OF INDUSTRIAL HEALTH 5-
27 (1978).
65. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-217 (Supp. III 1979).
66. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (Supp. I1 1979).
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public law and supported by the most rudimentary conceptions of mo-
rality will be treated as "benefits" for which individuals should be
"willing to pay." The demand for risk-benefit analysis, as a Congres-
sional staff scientist has said, "is the invention of those who do not wish
to regulate, or to be regulated . . . . Its primary use in government
decision-making is to avoid taking action which is necessary or desira-
ble in order truly to protect the health of the public or the integrity of
the environment.
67
There is a distinction between what we are willing to pay for as
individual consumers of goods and services and what we determine as
citizens we owe to each other and to our surroundings. There is a dif-
ference, in other words, between what we would do as individuals com-
peting in a market and what we would do as members of the public
building a conception of ourselves as a community. The great threat
hazardous wastes and workplace pollution pose is not, perhaps, to our
health and safety but to our sense of being a community capable of
acting in association, not in competition, with each other. Economic
approaches to pollution, more than anything, make us fear for that con-
ception of ourselves.
67. Zimmerman, Risk-Benefit Analysis: The Cop-Out of Government Regulation, TRIAL,
Feb. 1978, at 43, 44. Zimmerman was then staff scientist for the House Subcommittee on
Health and the Environment.
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